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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451. It would seem that the courts should abandon the
sham to which they have resorted and expressly make aesthetics a ground
for the exercise of the police power. Cf. Freund Police Power (1904) sec.
182, "It is conceded that the police power is adequate to restrain offensive
noises and odors. A similar protection to the eye, it is conceived, would not
establish a new principle, but carry a recognized principle to further
applications."
A. J. G. '36.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRAL BY JuRY-ADDITUR-Plaintiff brought a
personal injuries suit in a United States District Court; the jury returned
a verdict in his favor for $500; the court ruled in favor of a new trial for
inadequacy of damages unless defendant should consent to an increase to
the sum of $1500. Defendant's consent resulted in an automatic denial of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, whence certiorari to the Supreme Court. Held The action of the
trial court was unconstitutional as a violation of Amendment VII of the
United States Constitution providing that "In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules
of the common law." Dimick v. Schiedt (1935) 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 256.
The court premised its decision on the accepted interpretation of Amend-
ment VII as embodying the common law as it existed at the time of the
adoption of the constitutional provision. United States v. Wonson (1812)
28 Fed. Cas. 745, at 750; Thompson v. Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343; Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof (1899) 174 U. S. 1 at 8; Patton v. United States (1930)
281 U. S. 276. As far back as the Year Books English judges increased
inadequate verdicts in cases of mayhem. 2 Bacon's Abridgment 611 (7th.
ed.) The practice continued well into the eighteenth century. Burton v.
Baynes (1733) Barnes notes 153, 94 Eng. Rep. 852; and see Brown v.
Seymour (1742) 1 Wils. 5, 95 Eng. Rep. 461; Beardmore v. Carrington
(1764) 2 Wils. 244, 95 Eng. Rep. 790. The court in the instant decision de-
clared it could find no more recent case than Burton v. Baynes, supra, in
which this power was actually exercised; it decided that by the end of the
eighteenth century the judicial power thus to increase damages had become
atrophied. Apparently the court's attention was not directed to Armytage
v. Haley (1843) 4 Q. B. 917 in which the plaintiff brought an action on
the case for negligence, recovered a nominal verdict and obtained a rule
to show cause why a new trial should not be granted unless defendant
would consent to an increase in damages. In any event, persistent dicta
gave the practice of additur at least an umbrageous existence in the English
courts until the beginning of the twentieth century. Judicial addition as
well as remission from verdicts was finally outlawed by the leading case of
Watt v. Watt (1905) A. C. 115.
The court was obliged to distinguish the present case from well estab-
lished decisions upholding the power of the federal trial judge to deny a
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motion for a new trial for excessive damages upon condition that the plain-
tiff consent to a remittitur. Blunt v. Little (C. C. D. Mass. 1822) Fed.
Cas. No. 1578; Arkansas Valley Co. v. Mann (1888) 130 U. S. 69; Gila
Valley R. Co. v. Hall (1914) 232 U. S. 94. It did so on the somewhat
startling ground that where a remittitur is allowed to decrease the verdict
the jury have nevertheless awarded the sum finally assessed, whereas in
the case of additur no jury has passed on the increased amount.
A strong dissent attacks the majority reasoning on all sides. The trial
judge's sound discretion in granting or refusing a new trial for inadequate
damages is not reviewable. Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniel8 (1882) 107 U. S.
454; Fitzgerald & Mallory Co. v. Fitzgerald (1890) 137 U. S. 98. He might
unconditionally have denied a new trial to the plaintiff. A fortiori no right
of the plaintiff suffers infringement if the court deny the new trial on
condition that the defendant increase his damages. See Arkansas Valley
Co. v. Mann supra. This reasoning might be attacked on the basis that
by the very act of granting an additur the trial court has made a fact
finding of inadequacy of damages and thus no longer has the power to
refuse a new trial. The superior court can then order an unconditional
new trial without in any way interfering with the lower court's discretion,
which has already been exercised in the finding of inadequate damages.
A sounder rationale is contained in the statement that the practice of
additur cannot validly be distinguished from that of remittitur: "For in
neither does the jury return a verdict for the amount actually recovered,
and in both the amount of recovery was fixed, not by the verdict but by the
consent of the party resisting the motion for a new trial" Dimick v. Schiedt
supra. More fundamental than this, however, is the consideration that
Amendment VII was intended to preserve the essentials rather than the
"minutiae" of trial by jury. Parsons v. Bedford (1830) 3 Peters 433. Thus
the constitutionality of granting new trials as to damages alone, although
unknown to the older common law, has been upheld on the ground that
"the Seventh Amendment does not exact the retention of old forms of
procedure." Garoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. (1931) 283
U. S. 494, at 498. The common law adopted by the Constitution was some-
thing more than a "miscellaneous collection of precedents"; it was a sys-
tem containing a vital principle of growth and adaptibility; precedents are
in a sense but evidences of the past and guides for the future dynamic
progress of the common law. Hurtado v. California (1883) 110 U. S. 516,
at 530; Funk v. United States (1933) 290 U. S. 371. Indeed, the efficacy
and continued existence of the trial by jury in the past were made possible
only by a process of increasing and shifting impositions of judicial control.
Holdsworth "A History of English Law" (3rd. ed. 1922) Vol. I, p. 321.
The desirability of the dissenting view is enhanced by considerations of
expediency as well as logic. Time and expense obviously are saved by obvi-
ating the necessity of a new trial. Several state courts utilize the additur.
Campbell v. Sutliff (1927) 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374; Gaffney v. Illings-
worth (1917) 90 N. J. Law 490, 101 Ati. 243; see note (1934) 44 Yale Law
Journal 318.
C. B. P. '35.
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